Ukraine Steel Profile
Ukraine has been one of the world's most important steel and iron ore producers for generations — a legacy of Soviet-era industrial investment in the Kryvyi Rih iron ore basin, the Donbas coking coal fields, and the integrated steel complexes of Zaporishzhia, Kamianske, and Mariupol.
Before Russia's full-scale invasion in February 2022, Ukraine produced approximately 21 Mt of crude steel per year, employed hundreds of thousands in the metals sector, and generated roughly 10% of GDP and 33% of export earnings from the mining and metals complex.
The invasion has been catastrophic: two giant integrated steelworks in Mariupol (Azovstal and Illich, collectively over 10 Mt/yr of pre-war capacity) were destroyed or occupied, the Donbas coking coal mines fell progressively under Russian control, and energy infrastructure attacks have imposed severe electricity shortages on surviving plants. By 2023, production had fallen to approximately 6.2 Mt.
The partial recovery to approximately 7.6 Mt in 2024 — driven by the unblocking of Black Sea export routes and the determination of remaining producers — represents remarkable resilience under extraordinary conditions, but output remains barely a third of pre-war levels. This page provides an independent overview of Ukraine's surviving steel industry covering facilities, logistics, scrap flows, ownership, resources, and the structural issues that will shape its trajectory during and after the conflict.
Analysis by Dr Andrzej M Kotas, independent steel industry advisor with 30+ years of advisory experience across 20+ countries.
🏭 Overview of the Ukrainian Steel Industry
Historical Role & Strategic Importance
Steel has been central to Ukraine's economic identity since the Soviet industrialisation of the Donbas and Kryvyi Rih in the 1930s. The country was endowed with a rare coincidence of world-class iron ore (the Kryvyi Rih Basin — Europe's largest iron ore deposit), coking coal (Donbas), and the Dnipro River for water and transport. This combination underpinned the construction of massive integrated steelworks — at Dnipro (formerly Dnipropetrovsk), Zaporishzhia, Kamianske (formerly Dniprodzerzhynsk), and Mariupol — that made Ukraine one of the world's leading steel producers through independence and into the 2010s.
Before the full-scale invasion, the mining and metals complex contributed approximately 10% of Ukraine's GDP and 33% of its export revenues — making it by far the largest single industrial contributor to the national economy. The sector employed several hundred thousand people directly and supported millions more in dependent industries, logistics, and communities. The destruction and disruption caused by the invasion since February 2022 has been correspondingly severe: of nine major integrated steelmaking sites operating in 2021, only six survived under Ukrainian control by 2024, and those six were operating at sharply reduced utilisation rates.[1]
Production Output 2022–2024
Ukraine produced approximately 7.6 Mt of crude steel in 2024 — up 21.6% from 6.2 Mt in 2023 and well above the wartime low of approximately 6.3 Mt in 2022, but still only about 36% of the 21 Mt produced in 2021. The recovery in 2024 was driven primarily by the re-opening of Black Sea export routes through Ukraine's unilaterally established maritime corridor in late 2023, which restored access to key export markets including the EU, MENA, and Asia for both steel products and iron ore. ArcelorMittal Kryvyi Rih led the recovery, increasing steel output by approximately 70% year-on-year to 1.65 Mt, while Metinvest's surviving plants (Zaporishstal and Kamet Steel) operated at approximately 75% of their reduced wartime capacity.[2]
Production in 2025 faces a significant new constraint: the suspension of the Pokrovsk coking coal mine in January 2025, as Russian forces advanced on the town of Pokrovsk in Donetsk Oblast. Pokrovsk was Ukraine's only domestically-controlled coking coal source, supplying approximately 66% of Ukrainian steelmakers' coal needs. All surviving BF–BOF producers must now source coking coal entirely from imports — a significant additional cost burden. The steelmakers' union had warned that the Pokrovsk closure could reduce production to 2–3 Mt in 2025.
📊 Market
Consumption & Per Capita Demand
Ukraine's apparent finished steel use collapsed following the invasion, from approximately 5–6 Mt/yr pre-war to roughly 2.1 Mt in 2022, recovering partially to approximately 3.6 Mt in 2024 per World Steel Association data. Per capita consumption was approximately 95 kg/yr in 2024, reflecting the combination of wartime economic contraction, the displacement of approximately 6–8 million people from their homes, the suspension of major construction activity in conflict zones, and the partial destruction of industrial and residential infrastructure. Domestic demand has been partially supported by military-industrial consumption (steel for fortifications, vehicles, and engineering works) and emergency infrastructure repair.[3]
Reconstruction-phase demand is expected to be transformative: Oxford University researchers have estimated that Ukraine's reconstruction steel requirements over 20 years could total approximately $62 billion of investment — implying very large volumes of structural steel, rebar, pipe, and plate for housing, bridges, roads, energy infrastructure, and industrial facilities. This reconstruction demand is a central element of the post-war investment case for Ukrainian steelmakers.
Trade
Ukraine is a structural net exporter of steel — a position maintained even under wartime conditions, because production significantly exceeds the depressed domestic market. World Steel Association data shows Ukraine recorded net steel exports of approximately 3.4 Mt in 2024, ranking it tenth among global net steel exporters. The primary export markets are EU countries (which accounted for the majority of exports throughout the war, both as direct consumers and as transit hubs) and MENA region destinations.[3] Principal products exported are semi-finished products (billets, slabs), long products (rebar, sections, wire rod), and pig iron — reflecting the product mix of surviving plants and the comparative advantage Ukraine retains in lower-value-added steel and iron-bearing materials.
Export logistics have been transformed by the war. Pre-war, the majority of exports moved through Black Sea ports. During 2022–23, exports were largely rerouted via rail through EU border crossings (Poland, Slovakia, Romania), with the Danube ports (Izmail, Reni) serving as secondary gateways. The re-opening of the Odesa maritime corridor from September 2023 significantly improved economics and volume capacity, though freight premiums above pre-war rates and vessel insurance costs remain elevated.
🏗️ Main Plants & Facilities
Ukraine's pre-war steelmaking capacity was anchored in a cluster of large integrated BF–BOF/open hearth furnace (OHF) plants. The table below covers both surviving and destroyed/occupied facilities to provide a complete picture of the pre-war and current landscape.
↔ Scroll to see all columns
| Plant | Location | Process | Pre-war capacity | Main Products | Owner / Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ArcelorMittal Kryvyi Rih (AMKR)Ukraine's largest surviving integrated works; ~80km from front line; running at 25–30% pre-war capacity; temporary 50% reached mid-2024 | Kryvyi Rih, Dnipropetrovsk | BF–BOF | ~6 Mt/yr steel; ~5.5 Mt/yr pig iron | Rebar, wire rod, sections, billets, pig iron | ArcelorMittal (95.1%) — Operational |
| ZaporishstalJoint venture; three BF operating 2024; shut down Dec 2025 after massive Russian missile strike on power infrastructure | Zaporishzhia | BF–BOF + OHF | ~4 Mt/yr | Flat products (HRC), semi-finished | Metinvest (49.9%) / SCM (50.1%) JV — Severely disrupted |
| Kamet Steel (formerly Dnipropetrovsk Metallurgical Plant)Two BF operational; comprehensive modernisation planned post-war; US$20M cogeneration investment underway | Kamianske, Dnipropetrovsk | BF–BOF | ~4 Mt/yr | Flat products, semi-finished, pig iron | Metinvest (100%) — Operational (reduced) |
| Interpipe SteelEAF-based; Ukraine's largest EAF works; produces steel for seamless pipe and railway wheels; relatively insulated from energy outages by own generation | Dnipro (Dnipropetrovsk) | EAF | ~1.3 Mt/yr | Billets for seamless pipe, railway wheels, special steels | Interpipe Group (Victor Pinchuk) — Operational |
| DniprospetsstalSpecialist EAF plant; alloy and stainless steels; defence-relevant specialty steels | Zaporishzhia | EAF | ~0.7 Mt/yr | Stainless, alloy, and engineering steels | Various Ukrainian shareholders — Operating at reduced level |
| Metinvest UnisteelEAF rebar and sections; part of Metinvest group; serves construction demand in Kryvyi Rih region | Kryvyi Rih, Dnipropetrovsk | EAF | ~0.5 Mt/yr | Rebar, merchant bar, sections | Metinvest (100%) — Operational |
| Azovstal (Metinvest)Near-totally destroyed by Russian bombardment during siege of Mariupol; Illich fell in April 2022, Azovstal fell May 2022 after 86-day siege; Russian authorities confirmed in 2023 that restoration is not planned | Mariupol, Donetsk Oblast | BF–BOF | ~5.5 Mt/yr | Flat products, semi-finished, pig iron | Metinvest — ❌ Seized / Destroyed 2022 |
| Illich Iron & Steel Works (Metinvest)Seized by Russian forces April 2022; badly damaged during siege; Russian officials stated it "will never operate as it previously did"; not operational under Ukrainian control | Mariupol, Donetsk Oblast | BF–BOF | ~5.5 Mt/yr | Plate, flat products, pipe strip, pig iron | Metinvest — ❌ Seized 2022 |
Pre-war capacities are design capacities. Current utilisation of surviving plants reflects wartime constraints including energy outages, logistics disruption, personnel shortages, and raw material supply disruption. Red rows indicate capacity under Russian occupation or destroyed; these are not included in Ukraine's reported production statistics. Sources: Global Energy Monitor, Metinvest, ArcelorMittal Kryvyi Rih, GMK Center. Data correct to Q1 2026 but subject to rapid change. For full plant-level data see our Steel Plant Capacity Database.
📐 Planned Investments
Wartime conditions have severely constrained capital investment in Ukrainian steelmaking. Major expansion and modernisation projects have been suspended; investment has been focused almost entirely on projects essential to maintaining existing production — emergency repairs, energy resilience (captive generation), safety-critical infrastructure, and raw material supply security. Metinvest invested approximately US$670 million across its Ukrainian sites in 2024, primarily in operational maintenance and targeted resilience projects.
Metinvest — Energy Resilience (Cogeneration)
Investor: Metinvest | Investment: ~US$20 million (Kamet Steel phase)
Status: Cogeneration units ordered and partially delivered; scheduled to be commissioned from late 2024 / early 2025. The cogeneration project is designed to provide emergency power to critical blast furnace equipment during grid outages caused by Russian missile strikes — preventing unplanned shutdowns that are highly damaging and costly to recover from. Similar projects planned for Northern Iron Ore. The programme reflects the industy's adaptation to a grid under constant attack.[4]
ArcelorMittal Kryvyi Rih — Tailing Facility
Investor: ArcelorMittal | Investment: >US$150 million
Status: First phase of the "Third Map" tailings storage facility completed 2024. This is categorised by AMKR as a "strategically critical" project — without it, iron ore mining in the Kryvyi Rih basin cannot continue safely, and production would have to stop. One of the very few major capital projects to continue during the war. The investment demonstrates ArcelorMittal's commitment to maintaining its Ukrainian operations despite operating at a financial loss.[5]
Metinvest — Piombino Green Steel Plant (Italy)
Investor: Metinvest (with Danieli and EU financing) | Total investment: EUR 2.5 billion
Status: Metinvest has signed an agreement to construct a green steel plant at Piombino, Italy (the former Acciai Speciali Terni / JSW Steel Italy site), scheduled to begin operations in 2028. The plant will use EAF technology and will serve as a pilot project and technology demonstration for the eventual modernisation of Zaporishstal and Kamet Steel post-war. EU financing and Italian regional grants are expected to fund a large proportion of the cost.[6]
Post-War Reconstruction Investment Pipeline
Framework: Oxford University / Ukrainian government estimates | Scale: $62 billion over 20 years
Status: Planning stage — contingent on cessation of hostilities. The Ukrainian steel industry's reconstruction investment plan, developed with international research partners, envisions a comprehensive rebuild of steelmaking capacity — including new EAF technology to replace the destroyed open hearth furnaces at Zaporishstal, modernisation of Kamet Steel, and potentially the construction of new capacity oriented towards reconstruction demand. Any significant capital commitment awaits a ceasefire and stability assurances.[1]
⚓ Logistics & Ports
Ukraine's steel logistics have been fundamentally disrupted by the invasion. Pre-war, over 70% of export cargo moved through Black Sea ports, with Mariupol, Odesa, Chornomorsk, Pivdennyi, and Mykolayiv serving as the principal steel and iron ore export gateways. The closure of Mariupol (occupied by Russia in May 2022) and the initial naval blockade of all Ukrainian Black Sea ports forced a complete rerouting of exports via rail through EU border crossings and the Danube river ports — at much higher cost and dramatically reduced throughput capacity.
Ukraine's principal pre-war export ports, now operating again under Ukraine's unilaterally established maritime corridor (from September 2023). Iron ore and steel are among the key cargoes handled — up to 30% of steel exports transit these ports per National Bank of Ukraine estimates. Freight rates remain above pre-war levels; vessel insurance costs are elevated due to military risk. Port infrastructure has been repeatedly targeted by Russian missile and drone strikes. Despite this, the corridor handled over 25 million tonnes of cargo in the first months of 2025.
Ukraine's Danube river ports (Izmail, Reni, Ust-Dunaysk) became critical alternative export gateways during the period when Black Sea ports were blockaded. Their capacity is limited relative to the pre-war Black Sea volumes, but they provided a lifeline for iron ore and steel exports in 2022–23. Rail connections to the Danube (1,520mm gauge) and transshipment to European rivers and Danube Black Sea routes have been expanded.
Ukraine's rail network uses the broader 1,520mm Soviet gauge, requiring transshipment or bogie change at EU borders (Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania). Key crossings for steel exports are Chop–Corna and Uzhhorod (to Slovakia), Izov and Mostyska–2 (to Poland), and Batevo (to Hungary). Rail capacity bottlenecks were severe in 2022 when all export cargo was rerouted by land; the reopening of Black Sea routes significantly reduced the pressure, but rail remains an essential secondary export channel.
Romania's major Black Sea port at Constanța has become an important transit hub for Ukrainian steel and iron ore during the war. Rail-borne cargo from Ukraine crosses the Romanian border and is transshipped through Constanța for onward sea freight, providing an alternative to direct Ukrainian Black Sea port shipments. Constanța's deep-water berths and established bulk and break-bulk handling capacity make it the most capable alternative routing option in the region. It supplements — rather than replaces — the Ukrainian Black Sea corridor, and has been particularly important when Ukrainian ports have faced heightened attack risk.
Mariupol's deep-water port was Ukraine's second-largest steel export gateway before the war, handling the output of Azovstal and Illich steelworks. Mariupol fell under Russian occupation in May 2022 and the port has been operating under Russian control since. The port's eventual return under Ukrainian jurisdiction — and the potential rebuilding of Mariupol's destroyed industrial capacity — is a key element of any future reconstruction scenario.
🏢 Ownership
Ukraine's steel industry was historically dominated by oligarchic ownership groups formed during the post-Soviet privatisation of the 1990s. The two dominant groups — Metinvest (controlled by Rinat Akhmetov, Ukraine's richest individual, through SCM Holdings) and ArcelorMittal Kryvyi Rih (owned by the Luxembourg-based global steel giant ArcelorMittal) — account for the vast majority of surviving integrated steelmaking capacity. Interpipe (Victor Pinchuk) controls the country's principal EAF-based special steel operation. The war has profoundly affected the ownership landscape: Metinvest lost approximately 65% of its Ukrainian steelmaking capacity through the seizure of its Mariupol plants. See also: Steel oligarchs — ownership profiles.
🌐 Overseas & Cross-Border Operations
Two distinct concepts apply throughout this page: installed-in-country capacity (all steelmaking located within Ukraine, regardless of who owns it) and nationally-owned capacity (steelmaking owned by Ukrainian producers, wherever located). Country-level output figures use the installed-in-country definition; the table below covers major cross-border holdings that bridge the two concepts. Note that the concepts must be read carefully in the context of the war: two large plants in Russian-occupied Mariupol are nominally Metinvest-owned but not under Ukrainian operational control.
| Producer | Overseas Entity | Location | Scale / Stake | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 🇺🇦 Metinvest | Metinvest Piombino (proposed) | Piombino, Italy | New EAF greenfield; EUR 2.5Bn total; scheduled 2028 | Green steel pilot plant; primarily EAF; Danieli as technology partner; EU financing expected; will serve as template for post-war modernisation of Zaporishstal and Kamet Steel |
| 🇺🇦 Metinvest | United Coal Company | Virginia / West Virginia, USA | Coking coal mining operation; now primary coking coal supply source for Ukrainian BF plants | Critical strategic asset following Pokrovsk mine suspension (Jan 2025); first 80,000 Mt shipment received Apr 2025; US coal substituting for lost Donbas supply |
| 🇺🇦 Metinvest | Metinvest EU distribution (Poland, Bulgaria, etc.) | Multiple EU locations | Steel service centres and distribution hubs; warehousing and processing | European service centre network used to distribute Ukrainian steel products in EU market; also serving as transit hubs for rail-routed exports during Black Sea blockade 2022–23 |
| 🇱🇺 ArcelorMittal | PJSC ArcelorMittal Kryvyi Rih | Kryvyi Rih, Ukraine | 95.1% ArcelorMittal; ~6 Mt/yr design capacity; 1.65 Mt actual 2024 | Foreign-owned but Ukrainian-operated; ArcelorMittal's commitment to maintain operations despite losses is strategically significant for the broader industry; largest FDI in Ukrainian steel |
⚙️ Resources: Raw Materials & Energy
🪨 Raw Materials
Ukraine's iron ore endowment is exceptional — the Kryvyi Rih Basin contains Europe's largest iron ore deposits, concentrated in a compact area in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast. Metinvest's three iron ore processing operations (Ingulets, Northern, and Central GOKs) continued to operate throughout the war, supplying both domestic steelmakers and — critically — export markets. Iron ore has become Ukraine's most important remaining foreign exchange earner: exports doubled to approximately 40 million tonnes in 2024 following the opening of the Black Sea corridor, with China as the dominant buyer. This iron ore export revenue is helping to cross-subsidise the loss-making steel operations.[7]
Coking coal has historically been Ukraine's other great raw material advantage, but this has been progressively eliminated by the war. The Donbas coking coal fields began falling under Russian/separatist control after 2014 and have been largely lost since 2022. The Pokrovsk mine — the last domestically-controlled coking coal source, supplying approximately 66% of Ukrainian steelmakers' needs — was suspended in January 2025. Ukrainian BF producers now source 100% of their coking coal from imports, primarily from Metinvest's United Coal Company in the USA and from third-party suppliers. The economics of Ukrainian BF steelmaking have been durably impaired.[8]
⚡ Energy
Energy supply has been one of the most severe constraints on Ukrainian steelmaking since 2022. Russia has systematically targeted Ukraine's power generation and transmission infrastructure — thermal power stations, hydroelectric dams, substations, and high-voltage lines — in a deliberate strategy of energy terrorism aimed at destroying Ukraine's economic and industrial capacity. By 2024, Ukraine had lost a large portion of its thermal and hydroelectric generation capacity to Russian strikes, forcing heavy dependence on expensive electricity imports from neighbouring EU states and creating severe industrial rationing.[9]
Blast furnace operations are particularly vulnerable to power outages: a blast furnace cannot simply be switched off and restarted — a cold or disrupted BF requires expensive and time-consuming reblowing procedures. A fire at a coke oven battery at AMKR caused by a power cut in summer 2024 cost the plant months of lost coke production. Metinvest's cogeneration programme and AMKR's use of large diesel generators represent the industry's adaptation to grid unreliability. Ukraine has substantial natural gas reserves and historically used gas in steelmaking; wartime gas supply is more secure than electricity but also affected by infrastructure attacks.
♻️ Scrap
Ukraine's scrap market has been deeply disrupted by the war. Pre-war, Ukraine was a modest net scrap importer, with its large EAF and OHF steelmaking sector consuming domestically-generated and imported ferrous scrap. The war has dramatically increased the volume of ferrous scrap available from destroyed infrastructure, military wreckage, and demolished buildings — though this "war scrap" is often contaminated, geographically dispersed, and not systematically collected under combat conditions. World Steel Association data (document 3 in context) shows Russia and other CIS including Ukraine as a region recording exports of approximately 1.4 Mt and imports of approximately 0.3 Mt of scrap in 2024 — though Ukraine's individual contribution within this regional figure is difficult to disaggregate precisely.
Collection
Ukraine's peacetime scrap collection was well-established, with integrated steelmakers (particularly Metinvest and Interpipe) operating scrap yards and collection networks. The war has both increased the theoretical availability of scrap (from damaged infrastructure and military material) and severely disrupted organised collection logistics. In areas near the front line, scrap collection is impossible; in rear areas, some collection of construction and industrial scrap continues. The post-war reconstruction period will generate enormous volumes of demolition scrap.
Exports
Ukraine is nominally recorded as part of a net scrap-exporting region (Russia & CIS + Ukraine). In practice, Ukraine's own scrap export volumes are modest and constrained by logistics, domestic demand, and wartime operational conditions. Ukraine has historically maintained export restrictions on scrap to protect domestic EAF steelmaking supply. During reconstruction, any scrap export policy will need to weigh domestic reconstruction steel needs against foreign exchange generation.
Imports
Ukraine imported relatively small quantities of scrap pre-war. During the war, import logistics through the Odesa corridor and land routes have made scrap imports more complex and expensive. The dominant ferrous raw material for EAF and OHF operations remains domestically-generated scrap, supplemented by DRI-equivalent materials (sponge iron) produced using domestic gas in some configurations.
Reconstruction Outlook
Post-war reconstruction will fundamentally reshape Ukraine's scrap landscape. Demolition of war-damaged buildings, infrastructure, and military wreckage will generate tens of millions of tonnes of ferrous scrap over the 2025–2035 period. This "reconstruction scrap" — if systematically collected and processed — could provide a major feedstock boost for EAF-based steelmaking, improving the economics of the technology transitions that CBAM compliance will eventually require: OHF-to-EAF at Zaporishstal, and reduced-carbon routes at the BF–BOF producers.
Scrap & Ferrous Waste in Wartime
War Wreckage as Scrap Resource
Ukraine's war has generated an unprecedented volume of damaged and destroyed military equipment, vehicles, and industrial machinery — potentially millions of tonnes of ferrous material. Recovery and processing of this material as steel scrap will be a significant post-war activity. Some estimates suggest battlefield wreckage alone (tanks, artillery, vehicles, aircraft) could yield several million tonnes of high-quality scrap. Landmine and unexploded ordnance contamination is a significant constraint on collection in former combat zones.
Post-war opportunitySafety constraintsReconstruction Demolition Scrap
The rebuilding of Ukraine's destroyed cities, infrastructure, and industrial facilities will require demolition of damaged structures before construction can begin. Ukrainian estimates suggest hundreds of thousands of buildings have been damaged or destroyed. Systematic capture of this demolition scrap — requiring organised collection, sorting, and processing infrastructure — could materially reduce the cost of EAF-based reconstruction steel production by providing low-cost domestic feedstock.
Medium-term supplyLogistics challenge🚚 Distribution
Ukraine's domestic steel distribution network has been severely disrupted by the war. Pre-war, distribution operated through a combination of producer-owned service centres (notably Metinvest SMC — Metinvest's Ukrainian and European distribution arm), independent steel distributors, and construction material retailers. The war has destroyed or abandoned distribution infrastructure in occupied territories (Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporishzhia, Kherson oblasts) and severely reduced demand in war-affected regions. The domestic market for steel has contracted to approximately 3.6 Mt in 2024 from a pre-war level of approximately 6–7 Mt.
Metinvest SMC
Metinvest's primary steel distribution arm in Ukraine, operating a network of service centres and stockpiling facilities in major industrial cities. Pre-war, Metinvest SMC was among Ukraine's largest steel distributors; wartime contraction has significantly reduced volumes. The distribution network continues to serve the construction, engineering, and defence-related manufacturing sectors that remain active under wartime conditions. Also operates European service centres that serve as transit and re-export hubs.
Integrated distributionEU networkIndependent Distributors & Builders' Merchants
A network of independent steel distributors and construction material merchants continues to operate in government-controlled territory, primarily serving the construction sector (emergency repair works, military fortification, infrastructure maintenance) and engineering industries. Distribution in western Ukraine (Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Zakarpattia regions) has been less disrupted and serves as a base for supply to reconstruction projects as they progressively restart. Emergency and defence-related procurement is largely handled through direct government contracts with producers rather than through the commercial distribution chain.
War-disruptedWestern focusPost-War Reconstruction Supply Chain
Ukraine's reconstruction — once it begins in earnest — will require an entirely rebuilt distribution and logistics infrastructure for steel supply. International development banks (EBRD, World Bank, EIB) and donor governments are already planning reconstruction supply chain frameworks. The key questions are: how much steel will be sourced domestically versus imported; what role will direct EU supply chains play given Ukraine's EU accession track; and how will the distribution infrastructure be rebuilt to serve dispersed reconstruction sites across all regions of Ukraine.
Future planningInternational financing⚠️ Issues
Russia's ongoing rocket and drone strikes directly target steel plants and their supporting infrastructure — power substations feeding blast furnaces, coking batteries, rolling mills, and rail connections. The vulnerability is acute: a single strike on a substation can force an unplanned blast furnace shutdown requiring days to restart at a cost of millions of dollars. The December 2025 mass missile strike that forced Zaporishstal to shut down completely is the most dramatic example, but targeted attacks on AMKR, Kamet Steel, and associated logistics infrastructure have been a continuous feature of the war since 2022.
Production in 2024 was 7.6 Mt — barely 36% of Ukraine's 21 Mt in 2021 — and 2025 output came in at 7.41 Mt, a modest 2.2% decline year-on-year as attack damage offset underlying operational improvement.[1] The front-line proximity of surviving plants remains extreme: at its closest approach in early 2022, Russian ground forces came to within approximately 50 km of Kryvyi Rih (where AMKR is located), though the front line in the south has since stabilised further east. Zaporishstal operates in a city that is itself partly occupied; and the Dnipro plants are within range of regular strike packages.
Ukraine's military mobilisation has removed a significant share of the industrial workforce from steel plants and mines. Skilled workers — blast furnace operators, coke oven technicians, rolling mill crews, maintenance engineers — are among those conscripted, and their replacement with less experienced personnel creates both productivity and safety risks. The AMKR plant alone employs 18,000 people directly and supports more than 50,000 family members; Metinvest's Ukrainian operations run to tens of thousands more. Mass wartime departures (emigration, internal displacement, and conscription combined) have created structural labour gaps that will persist well beyond any ceasefire.
AMKR's forced closures in early 2026 — the blooming shop, the casting and mechanical plant — resulted in over 2,400 redundancies. These job losses compound the demographic damage already inflicted by the war, narrowing the skilled workforce available to support any post-war reconstruction investment cycle.
The suspension of the Pokrovsk mine in January 2025 is the most significant raw material shock to Ukrainian steelmaking since the initial invasion. Pokrovsk was the only domestically-controlled coking coal source, supplying approximately 66% of steelmakers' coal needs.[8] Ukrainian steelmakers must now import 100% of their coking coal, primarily from Metinvest's United Coal Company in the USA and from international markets. Metinvest's rapid response — receiving the first 80,000-tonne US coal shipment in April 2025 — demonstrated resilience, but the economics of BF-based steelmaking have been structurally impaired.
The import logistics add cost on top of an already stressed cost base. The steelmakers' union estimated the closure could reduce production to 2–3 Mt in 2025 if import supply chains could not be established quickly; in the event, output held closer to 2024 levels, but the structural vulnerability remains.
See also: Steel Production Costs | Critical Raw Materials Security
Russia's systematic destruction of Ukraine's generation capacity — thermal power stations, hydro facilities, substations, and transmission lines — has eliminated most of the country's baseload electricity. Ukraine now imports a substantial share of its power from the European grid at significantly higher cost than pre-war domestic generation. For energy-intensive steelmaking, this represents an existential cost burden: AMKR reported electricity prices rising from approximately $120/MWh in Q2 2024 to $230/MWh in February 2026, with peak-hour prices reaching up to $370/MWh — levels far above those faced by European competitors.[12]
The industry has invested in captive generation (cogeneration, diesel backup) but these provide only partial mitigation. Ukraine's energy system reconstruction is a prerequisite for any serious industrial recovery — and any realistic prospect of CBAM compliance investment.
The EU's Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) entered its definitive financial phase on 1 January 2026. Contrary to expectations widely held by Ukrainian producers and the Ukrainian government, the European Commission declined to apply a Force Majeure exemption under Article 30.7 of the CBAM Regulation — despite Ukraine's status as a country under active military invasion. The decision was reportedly taken to avoid setting a precedent for other countries.[11]
The commercial impact in Q1 2026 was immediate and severe. ArcelorMittal Kryvyi Rih — which had built the EU into its primary export market after the war closed routes to the Middle East and Africa — saw approximately 300,000 tonnes of Q1 orders cancelled once European customers learned of additional CBAM costs of $60–90/tonne. The company's full-year 2026 EU sales plan of 1.2–1.25 Mt was effectively lost. AMKR subsequently announced closure of its blooming shop and casting and mechanical plant, with over 2,400 job losses directly attributable to the CBAM impact combined with energy costs.[12]
Metinvest reported over 240,000 tonnes of billet and long product orders cancelled in Q1 2026; planned exports of approximately 600,000 tonnes of pig iron to the EU were abandoned entirely. Without a derogation or transition period, GMK Center analysis projects that exports of long products and square billets to the EU will cease entirely by 2028–2030, pig iron exports will decline by 75%, and flat product exports by 30% — eliminating roughly 3.5 Mt of annual EU-destined steel trade. Cumulative CBAM payments over 2026–2030 are estimated at €1.2 billion, equivalent to two years of capital investment in the entire Ukrainian steel industry.[11]
See also: Two Worlds: Carbon Pricing Splits the Steel Industry | EU Steel Action Plan 2025
Ukraine's export logistics remain severely constrained relative to pre-war conditions. Black Sea port access — the pre-war dominant route for steel and iron ore — was restored through Ukraine's unilaterally established maritime corridor from September 2023, but operating conditions remain far from normal. Vessel insurance costs are elevated due to military risk, port infrastructure at the Greater Odesa complex has been repeatedly struck by Russian missiles and drones, and freight rates remain above pre-war benchmarks.
Rail export routes through western Ukraine border crossings to the EU continue to operate — and became critical during the 2022–23 Black Sea blockade — but rail capacity is constrained by the gauge change at EU borders and by Russian attacks on the Ukrainian rail network. Romania's Black Sea port of Constanța has emerged as an important transit hub, with Ukrainian cargoes moving by rail to Romania for transshipment by sea.
The loss of Mariupol port (seized in May 2022) remains a permanent structural impairment: the Azov Sea gateway that served Azovstal and Illich at multi-million tonne scale has been under Russian control since and is not available to Ukrainian exporters. CBAM has added a new dimension of export market risk: the EU absorbed approximately 81% of Ukrainian finished steel exports in 2025, making any regulatory deterioration in EU access acutely damaging.
The destruction and seizure of Azovstal and the Illich (Ilyich) Iron and Steel Works in Mariupol eliminated two major integrated producers located on Ukraine's Black Sea / Azov coast. Both plants were effectively destroyed and seized during the siege of Mariupol in 2022: Illich fell to Russian forces in April 2022; Azovstal was near-totally destroyed by Russian bombardment during the 86-day siege, with the last defenders surrendering in May 2022.
A Russian construction ministry official confirmed in January 2023 that Azovstal would not be restored, and that Illich "will never operate as it previously did." A third Metinvest plant, Yenakiieve Steel (Donetsk Oblast), was effectively seized earlier — nationalised by the separatist DPR in March 2017 — and declared bankrupt in 2019, though it was not physically destroyed in the same way.
Before the war, both Mariupol plants were large-scale producers and exporters of merchant pig iron — a commodity exported in volume through Mariupol's deep-water port to steel mills in the EU and North America. Together the two plants represented over 10 Mt/yr of pre-war steelmaking capacity.
Their permanent loss has created a structural pig iron supply gap in international trade. Ukraine's surviving blast furnaces have partly compensated — pig iron production grew 11.2% to 7.88 Mt in 2025, partly driven by external demand — but the scale and geographic advantage of the Mariupol plants (Black Sea / Azov access, short sea routes to European and North American buyers) cannot be fully replicated from inland Dnipro basin locations. CBAM now threatens even the replacement pig iron export flows.
See also: Semi-Finished Steel Products | Steel Industry M&A Trend Analysis
Ukraine's post-war reconstruction represents the most compelling medium-term steel demand opportunity in the world. Oxford University researchers estimate reconstruction steel requirements of approximately $62 billion over 20 years — housing, bridges, roads, energy infrastructure, ports, railways, and industrial facilities. The reconstruction period also provides a unique technology transformation opportunity: converting Zaporishstal from Soviet-era OHF to EAF, and transitioning BF–BOF producers to lower-carbon routes, would simultaneously address CBAM compliance, reduce energy intensity, and orientate production towards reconstruction product mixes (rebar, structural sections, plate, pipe).
However, no serious investor can commit to new capacity while the war continues. A durable peace settlement — and clarity on the status of occupied territories containing Metinvest's seized Mariupol assets — is the prerequisite for unlocking the reconstruction steel investment cycle.
See also: Do Developing Economies Need Steel? | Long Steel Products
Ukraine's post-war industrial landscape could position it as a structurally competitive green steel producer — not merely a reconstructed version of its pre-war carbon-intensive configuration. Two endowments underpin this opportunity.
First, Ukraine holds some of the world's highest-quality iron ore deposits in the Kryvyi Rih basin — premium direct reduction (DR) grade pellets with high iron content and low impurities are ideal feedstock for hydrogen-based direct reduced iron (H₂-DRI) steelmaking, the technology pathway most compatible with near-zero carbon EAF production.
Second, Ukraine operates a substantial fleet of nuclear power stations (including the Zaporishzhia NPP, Europe's largest) that, once the war ends and normal grid operations resume, could supply large volumes of low-carbon baseload electricity — a critical input for both electrolysis-based green hydrogen production and EAF steelmaking.
When hostilities cease, Ukraine could therefore combine premium DR-grade iron ore with nuclear-powered green hydrogen to produce H₂-DRI and green EAF steel at internationally competitive cost — a supply chain configuration that very few countries can replicate. This positions Ukrainian steel not merely as a reconstruction story but as a potential green steel export platform serving the EU market under CBAM's low-carbon premium. The Metinvest Piombino project in Italy is partly a technology learning exercise for this future configuration.
See also: Green Steel & Decarbonisation | Trillion Dollar Hydrogen Infrastructure for Steel | What If Steel Stays Dirty?
📚 Sources & Further Reading
Authoritative sources underpinning the data and analysis on this page.
World Steel Association
- World Steel in Figures — annual production & trade data
- Monthly crude steel statistics
GMK Center
- Ukraine's leading metallurgical research and consultancy
- Monthly production, export, and market data for Ukrainian steel
- Wartime industry analysis and policy commentary
Metinvest Corporate History
- Timeline of Metinvest's formation and growth 2006–2025
- Azovstal, Illich, Yenakiieve, Zaporishstal — plant acquisitions and losses
- SCM Holdings / Akhmetov ownership structure
Metinvest
- Annual reports and operational updates
- Wartime production results and contingency plans
- News and media releases
ArcelorMittal Kryvyi Rih
- Annual production results
- Wartime operational updates
- Tailings and environmental project reporting
Global Energy Monitor
- Global Steel Plant Tracker — Ukrainian plant status during war
- Plant-level damage and operational status data
References
- Kyiv Independent (2024): Ukraine's steel industry is maxed out, September 2024 — wartime production overview, plant status, Metinvest capacity loss; Oxford University $62 billion reconstruction steel estimate cited
- Reuters / Market Screener (2025): Ukraine's ArcelorMittal boosts steel output by 70% in 2024, January 2025; ArcelorMittal Kryvyi Rih press release, January 2025
- World Steel Association (2025): World Steel in Figures 2025 — Ukraine production, consumption, per capita, and trade data 2020–2024
- Metinvest (2024): Green Steel and New Export Routes — How Metinvest is Transforming During the War (The Page interview with COO Oleksandr Myronenko) — energy resilience investments, cogeneration programme, US$670M 2024 investment
- ArcelorMittal Kryvyi Rih (2025): Production results for 2024 — steel, pig iron, ore, and coke production data; tailings facility investment; wartime challenges summary
- Metinvest CEO Forbes interview (2025): Our goal is to make Metinvest a leading global green steel producer — Piombino plant EUR 2.5Bn investment, post-war modernisation strategy, 2024 US$670M Ukraine investment data
- OSW Centre for Eastern Studies (2025): Ukraine's trade in 2024: restoration of logistical routes — iron ore export data, Black Sea corridor impact, steel trade recovery analysis
- Kyiv Independent (2025): Ukraine's steel sector looks abroad after loss of critical Donbas coal mine — Pokrovsk mine suspension, 66% coking coal dependency, US coal import substitution; Kyiv Independent (2025): first US coal shipment, April 2025
- GMK Center (2024): Challenges for Ukrainian iron and steel industry in 2024 — energy supply issues, CBAM analysis, logistics challenges
- GMK Center (2024): CBAM impact analysis for Ukrainian steel — estimated loss of 1.6 Mt long product/semi-finished exports and 1.4 Mt pig iron to EU under full CBAM application
- GMK Center (2026): The first few months of CBAM implementation have already had a negative impact on the Ukrainian steel industry — AMKR 300,000t Q1 cancellations; Metinvest billet/long product and pig iron order losses; GMK Center roundtable data; cumulative CBAM cost €1.2Bn 2026–2030 estimate; trajectory to zero long product/billet exports by 2028–2030
- Interfax-Ukraine / GMK Center (February–March 2026): AMKR CEO Mauro Longobardo interviews and press releases — electricity price escalation from $120/MWh (Q2 2024) to $230/MWh (February 2026); CBAM order cancellations; blooming shop and casting plant closures; 2,400+ job losses. Sources: Interfax-Ukraine; GMK Center (blooming mill closure)
How to Cite This Page
Kotas, A.M. (2026) 'Ukraine Steel Industry: Facilities, Resources & Analysis', SteelOnTheNet. Available at: https://www.steelonthenet.com/resources/countries/ukraine.html (Accessed: 7th October 2026).
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