China Steel Profile
China is by far the world's largest steel producer, accounting for more than half of global crude steel output — a dominance without precedent in any major commodity market. Having built this position through decades of state-directed investment, China now confronts a structural inflection: domestic steel demand has plateaued as the construction-driven supercycle fades, leaving an installed capacity base that significantly exceeds domestic requirements and generating persistent export surpluses that distort world markets. This page provides an independent assessment of China's steel industry, covering facilities, logistics, scrap flows, ownership, resources, distribution, and the structural issues that will define its trajectory.
Analysis by Dr Andrzej M Kotas, independent steel industry advisor with 30+ years of advisory experience across 20+ countries.
🏭 Overview of the Chinese Steel Industry
Role of Steel in the Chinese Economy
Steel has been central to China's extraordinary economic transformation. The industry expanded from roughly 100 Mt of annual output in 2000 to over 1,000 Mt by the mid-2010s — growth that underpinned the largest urbanisation and infrastructure programme in human history. The sector contributes approximately 3–4% of GDP and remains a significant direct and indirect employer. Steel is now deeply embedded in China's industrial supply chains for construction, automotive, shipbuilding, machinery, and energy infrastructure.[1]
However, the relationship between steel and economic growth has shifted. Infrastructure and residential construction — which together accounted for approximately 55–60% of Chinese steel demand at peak — are now in structural decline or stagnation. The industry faces the challenge of managing a capacity overhang accumulated over decades of state-guided expansion while simultaneously transitioning towards lower-carbon production technologies and maintaining employment in strategically sensitive regions.
Production Output & Global Share
China produced approximately 1,005 Mt of crude steel in 2024, representing around 53% of total world output.[2] This single-country dominance is structurally significant: Chinese production decisions, raw material procurement, and export volumes have a decisive effect on global steel prices, trade flows, and the competitive positions of producers everywhere. No other major commodity is so concentrated in a single national producer.
The production mix is dominated by BF–BOF steelmaking, which accounts for approximately 90% of output — a far higher proportion than in Europe or the USA, where EAF steelmaking has a larger share. The EAF segment is growing as scrap availability improves and decarbonisation pressure intensifies, but the transition from the dominant integrated route will be slow and capital-intensive.
📊 Market
Consumption & Demand Trajectory
Chinese finished steel consumption is estimated at approximately 857 Mt in 2024 — down from a peak of around 1,009 Mt in 2020 — reflecting the slowdown in residential construction following the property sector crisis.[2] Per capita consumption, at around 601 kg/yr, is extremely high by international standards but is expected to decline gradually as the construction cycle contracts. Infrastructure investment and manufacturing (automotive, shipbuilding, energy equipment) have partially offset construction weakness but cannot fully compensate at the margin.
Trade & Exports
China is a major and growing net steel exporter. Exports reached approximately 110–120 Mt in 2024 — the highest levels since 2015 — as domestic demand weakness pushed surplus production onto world markets at highly competitive, often near-cost prices.[3] This export surge has triggered anti-dumping investigations, safeguard duties, and diplomatic tensions across the EU, USA, India, Southeast Asia, and other regions. The export wave is a direct consequence of structural overcapacity and is likely to persist as long as domestic demand remains subdued.
🏗️ Main Plants & Facilities
China's steelmaking base spans hundreds of sites across dozens of provinces. The table below lists identified individual plant complexes only — each row represents a single named site. Group totals and geographic district aggregates (such as the Tangshan cluster, which comprises dozens of independently-owned mills) are excluded from this table as they are not site-level data. Capacity figures are approximate crude steel equivalents sourced primarily from the James King World Crude Steel Capacity database. For comprehensive plant-by-plant data across China and all major producing nations, see the Steel Plant Capacity Database.
↔ Scroll to see all columns
| Plant / Complex | Location | Process | Capacity (Mt/yr) | Main Products | Owner |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Baoshan (Baogang)World-class flat products complex; flagship of Baowu group | Shanghai | BF–BOF | ~20.0 | Automotive steel, cold rolled, coated, electrical steel | China Baowu |
| Wuhan Iron & Steel (WISCO)Merged into Baowu 2016; long and flat products | Hubei | BF–BOF | ~20.0 | HRC, cold rolled, long products | China Baowu |
| Angang (Anshan)One of China's oldest integrated steel complexes | Liaoning | BF–BOF | ~30.0 | Rails, plates, flat products, seamless tubes | Ansteel Group |
| Benxi SteelMerged with Ansteel 2021; specialist alloy and automotive steels | Liaoning | BF–BOF | ~17.0 | Automotive, alloy, special steels | Ansteel Group |
| HBIS Laoting (Caofeidian)Modern coastal complex; relocation of inland Hebei capacity | Hebei | BF–BOF | ~12.0 | Flat products, plates | HBIS |
| Shougang JingtangBuilt to replace Beijing capacity; world-class flat products site | Hebei (coastal) | BF–BOF | ~13.0 | HRC, cold rolled, galvanised, automotive | Shougang Group |
Site-level data only. Capacities are approximate crude steel equivalents from the James King World Crude Steel Capacity database. Many major Chinese producers operate across multiple sites not individually listed here — see the Steel Plant Capacity Database for full plant-level coverage. Data correct to Q1 2026.
📐 Investment & Capacity Policy
China's investment policy in steel has shifted fundamentally from expansion to rationalisation and technology upgrading. Following rounds of mandatory capacity cuts — removing over 150 Mt of outdated capacity between 2016 and 2020 — the government's current policy framework emphasises consolidation, environmental upgrading, and technology transition rather than net capacity growth.[1]
Coastal Relocation Programme
Policy driver: Air quality and land use | Scale: Tens of Mt relocated or planned
Status: Several major groups including Shougang and HBIS have built or are building world-class coastal facilities (Caofeidian / Jingtang corridor, Hebei coast) to replace inland capacity, improving logistics and reducing urban pollution. New coastal sites are typically more modern and efficient than the inland plants they replace.
Ultra-low Emissions Retrofits
Policy driver: MIIT / MEE ultra-low emissions standards | Scale: Industry-wide
Status: China's Ministry of Ecology and Environment has mandated ultra-low emissions standards for sintering, coking, and steelmaking facilities. The vast majority of large integrated plants have completed or are completing these retrofits, representing a significant capital investment programme — but one focused on air pollutants, not carbon emissions.
EAF Expansion
Policy driver: 14th Five-Year Plan, carbon targets | Target: 20–25% EAF share by 2025
Status: New EAF capacity is being built, principally in coastal provinces and the south. The pace has been constrained by the cost disadvantage of scrap-based EAF versus coal-based BF–BOF given Chinese energy and scrap price structures. Several large groups including Baowu and HBIS have announced EAF investment programmes.[6]
Green Steel & Hydrogen DRI Pilots
Policy driver: Carbon neutrality by 2060 | Scale: Pilot/demonstration phase
Status: China has a number of hydrogen-based DRI pilot projects, with Baowu and HBIS both announcing demonstration-scale investments. Commercial scale remains distant given the cost of green hydrogen, but China's government has signalled that steel will be a priority sector in its hydrogen economy roadmap.[7]
Industry Consolidation
Policy driver: State Council consolidation targets | Target: Top 10 groups to hold 60% of output
Status: The Chinese government has consistently pushed for consolidation, with the top 10 producers accounting for approximately 42% of output in 2024 — still well below the 60% target. Mergers between state-owned groups (e.g., Baowu absorbing WISCO, Magang, Chongqing Iron & Steel) continue, but the large private sector resists state absorption.[1]
Capacity Swap & Replacement Policy
Policy driver: MIIT capacity replacement rules | Status: Suspended — under revision (August 2024)
MIIT's capacity swap (产能置换) mechanism required retirement of existing capacity before any new steelmaking could be commissioned. Active swap ratios (from June 2021) were 1.5:1 for blast furnaces in key pollution regions and 1.25:1 elsewhere. The scheme was suspended in August 2024 — the second such suspension — pending a revised framework expected under the 15th Five-Year Plan (2026–2030).[1]
Overseas Investment
Policy driver: Belt and Road Initiative, raw material security
Status: Chinese steel groups have invested in steel plants in Southeast Asia (notably Indonesia — PT Dexin, Tsingshan at Morowali), Africa, and Central Asia. These overseas investments serve multiple purposes: accessing lower-cost production bases, circumventing anti-dumping duties on Chinese exports, and securing downstream markets for Chinese raw material and equipment exports.
⚓ Logistics & Ports
China's steel logistics are shaped by the concentration of iron ore imports (all arriving by sea), the geography of its domestic coal and ore deposits (Inner Mongolia, Shanxi, Hebei, Sichuan), and the location of major consuming industries along the eastern seaboard and Yangtze River corridor. The coastal and riverine logistics infrastructure is world-class; inland connectivity is improving rapidly through rail and highway investment.
China's largest iron ore import port and the logistics hub for the Hebei steel cluster. Handles Capesize and VLOC vessels. Captive port facilities serve HBIS Laoting and Shougang Jingtang coastal plants. Also a major coal import terminal. Throughput capacity exceeds 200 Mt/yr for iron ore alone.
One of China's largest general and bulk cargo ports, handling iron ore, coking coal, and finished steel. Serves the broader Bohai Economic Rim including Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei industrial cluster. Also a major container and steel product export gateway for northern China.
The world's largest container port; also handles significant iron ore and steel product flows. The Baoshan terminal provides direct port access for China Baowu's Shanghai complex. Yangshan deep-water port handles the largest Capesize ore carriers for import distribution across Yangtze Delta mills.
The world's busiest port by tonnage, handling large volumes of iron ore and coking coal alongside container traffic. Serves mills in Zhejiang, Jiangsu, and Anhui via river and rail connections. A key entry point for Australian and Brazilian iron ore destined for Yangtze Delta producers.
Rizhao is a specialist iron ore import port — one of the highest-throughput iron ore terminals in the world — serving Shandong steel mills and inland Shanxi producers via rail. Qingdao is a major general and container port, also handling steel exports and scrap imports.
🏢 Ownership
China's steel industry is a complex mixture of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), local government-controlled entities, and private groups. The state maintains dominant control over the largest producers through central and provincial government shareholdings, while a highly dynamic private sector — particularly in Jiangsu and Zhejiang — competes vigorously on cost and product range.
🌐 Overseas & Cross-Border Operations
Two distinct concepts apply throughout this page: installed-in-country capacity (all steelmaking located within this country, regardless of who owns it) and nationally-owned capacity (steelmaking owned by this country's producers, wherever located in the world). Country-level output and installed capacity figures use the installed-in-country definition. Producer-level figures refer to the operations relevant to this country unless explicitly stated otherwise. The table below summarises significant cross-border ownership interests that bridge the two concepts.
| Producer | Overseas Entity | Location | Scale / Stake | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 🇨🇳 HBIS Group | HBIS Serbia (Smederevo) | Serbia | ~2.2 Mt/yr integrated BF–BOF | Acquired from Serbian state 2016 (€46m); Serbia's only integrated steelmaker and its largest exporter, contributing ~1% of GDP. Products sold primarily into EU markets; CBAM reporting now under way. Subject to growing local environmental controversy — a 2024 protest drew over 4,000 residents citing air pollution and inadequate emissions controls. HBIS pays just €8,000/yr in Serbian ecological taxes, a figure activists argue is negligible relative to the plant's scale and revenues. |
| 🇨🇳 HBIS Group | HBIS South Africa | South Africa | Equity stake in former Highveld Steel assets | Part of HBIS's sub-Saharan African investment portfolio; aligned with Belt & Road industrial strategy |
| 🇨🇳 Tsingshan Group | PT Dexin / Morowali Industrial Park | Indonesia | ~10 Mt/yr stainless and carbon steel capacity | World's largest stainless steel complex; leverages Indonesian laterite nickel; Chinese technology, equipment, and management |
| 🇨🇳 Multiple groups (Baowu, HBIS, others) | Belt & Road steel investments | SE Asia, Africa, Central Asia | Dozens of projects; aggregate overseas capacity estimated >50 Mt | Serves market access, tariff circumvention, and raw material security objectives; often supported by Chinese state financing |
⚙️ Resources: Raw Materials & Energy
🪨 Raw Materials
China has large domestic iron ore reserves but of relatively low grade (average ~25–30% Fe), which are costly to process and uncompetitive with high-grade imported ore from Australia and Brazil at most price levels. As a result, despite being a substantial domestic iron ore producer (approximately 280 Mt of usable iron ore content in 2024), China imports around 1,100–1,200 Mt/yr of iron ore — primarily from Australia (~65% share) and Brazil (~20%).[8]
China is also a significant coking coal importer (~70 Mt/yr), drawing primarily from Mongolia, Australia, Russia, and the USA. Domestic coking coal reserves are substantial but unevenly distributed and partly high-sulphur; the balance between domestic supply and imports varies with rail capacity, coal quality requirements, and geopolitics — as demonstrated by the temporary Australian coal import ban in 2020–22.
⚡ Energy
China's steel industry is the world's largest single industrial consumer of energy and the dominant source of CO₂ in the steel sector globally. The industry is almost entirely coal-dependent for both process energy (coking coal in blast furnaces) and power generation (coal-fired grid). China's electricity tariffs for large industrial users are generally low by international standards, supporting the cost-competitiveness of electric arc furnace steelmaking as it grows.[7]
China is investing massively in renewable energy, and several steel producers are piloting captive wind and solar installations for downstream finishing lines. However, the transition of primary steelmaking — BF–BOF to EAF, or eventually to H₂-DRI — will require structural changes in both technology and energy infrastructure that will take decades and trillions of yuan.
♻️ Scrap
China is at a structural inflection point in its scrap economy. Decades of rapid steel consumption have built up an enormous stock of steel-in-use — in buildings, infrastructure, vehicles, and machinery — which is now beginning to reach end-of-life at scale. The volume of domestically available ferrous scrap is growing rapidly and is projected to increase very substantially through the 2030s, fundamentally altering the economics of EAF-based steelmaking relative to BF–BOF.
Collection
China generates approximately 230–250 Mt of ferrous scrap per year — by far the largest national volume in the world — and this is growing by 10–20 Mt annually.[9] The collection and processing sector, while fragmented, is large and increasingly organised. Several major steel groups have invested in or partnered with scrap processing enterprises to secure supply chains. The demolition of older residential and commercial buildings is becoming a significant source.
Imports
China banned the import of ferrous scrap in 2019 under its "National Sword" waste import restrictions, classifying it as solid waste. This policy has since been partially reversed: high-quality processed ferrous scrap can now be imported under specific standards. Import volumes remain small (a few Mt/yr) relative to domestic generation but are expected to grow as steel groups seek to supplement domestic supply.[9]
Exports
China does not export significant volumes of ferrous scrap. Domestic demand from the growing EAF sector and induction furnace producers absorbs available supply, and export controls are in place. China's scrap policy is explicitly oriented towards retaining domestic resources to support the EAF transition.
Future Trajectory
Chinese scrap availability is projected to reach 300–350 Mt/yr by 2030 and potentially 400+ Mt/yr by 2035–2040 as the enormous steel-in-use stock from the 2000s–2020s construction boom matures.[7] This would make the economics of large-scale EAF steelmaking in China compelling — and is the primary structural argument for a major technology shift from BF–BOF to scrap-based EAF over the next two decades.
Scrap Policy & Infrastructure
National Scrap Standards
China has introduced GB/T standards for ferrous scrap classification, processing quality, and import specifications. The standardisation effort is intended to professionalise the collection and processing sector, improve scrap quality for EAF consumption, and enable the controlled resumption of scrap imports to supplement domestic supply as needed.
RegulatoryQuality standardsScrap Processing Enterprises
China's scrap processing sector includes several large state-affiliated enterprises (China Metal Recycling, Shougang Junzheng) as well as a vast number of private operators. The sector is undergoing consolidation and formalisation under government pressure to raise standards. Several major steel groups are vertically integrating into scrap collection and processing.
ConsolidatingSOE & private🚚 Distribution
Steel distribution in China operates through a combination of direct mill-to-customer contracts (primarily for large industrial buyers such as automotive OEMs and shipyards), an extensive national network of steel trading companies and service centres, and a large and sophisticated spot market — including the Shanghai Futures Exchange (SHFE) rebar and hot-rolled coil futures markets, which are among the world's most liquid commodity futures contracts.
Steel Trading Companies
China has tens of thousands of registered steel trading companies, ranging from large national distributors (e.g., China Minmetals, Sinosteel) to regional stockists. The trading sector plays a critical role in inventory management, credit provision to downstream users, and price discovery. Several large steel groups operate captive trading arms or have strategic shareholdings in major distributors.
FragmentedNational reachSteel Service Centres
A growing network of steel service centres provides processing (slitting, cutting, blanking, profiling) and just-in-time delivery to automotive, appliance, and engineering customers. The automotive sector — particularly around Shanghai, Guangzhou, and Wuhan — has driven the development of sophisticated direct supply chains linking mills such as Baosteel with OEM stamping facilities.
Value-addedAutomotiveE-Commerce & Digital Platforms
China's steel distribution sector has been significantly disrupted by digital trading platforms. Ouyeel (Baowu-backed), Zhaogang.com, and other B2B steel e-commerce platforms have captured significant transaction volumes, offering online price comparison, logistics integration, and supply chain finance. China is a global leader in the digitalisation of steel distribution.
Digital leaderB2B platformKey consuming corridors include the Yangtze River Delta (Shanghai–Nanjing–Hangzhou), the Pearl River Delta (Guangzhou–Shenzhen–Foshan), the Bohai Economic Rim (Beijing–Tianjin–Tangshan), and the rapidly growing central and western industrial zones (Wuhan, Chengdu–Chongqing). Construction-grade long products (rebar, wire rod) are traded largely through spot channels, while flat products for automotive, appliance, and shipbuilding are typically sold on annual or semi-annual mill contracts.
⚠️ Issues
China's installed steelmaking capacity — estimated at over 1,100 Mt/yr against domestic consumption of approximately 857 Mt — creates a persistent structural surplus. Despite multiple rounds of government-mandated capacity cuts since 2015, the aggregate installed base has not materially declined because cuts to older capacity have been offset by investment in newer, larger facilities.[10]
The overcapacity problem is deeply rooted in the political economy: local governments depend on steel mills for employment and fiscal revenue, state-controlled banks have large loan exposures to steel groups, and closure of capacity imposes concentrated local costs against diffuse global benefits. The capacity swap mechanism — requiring retirement of existing tonnage as a condition of new investment — was intended to cap the total base, but swap ratios measured in nominal capacity indices rather than actual output, combined with the superior productivity of new equipment, mean that aggregate production potential has continued to grow even as older plant is formally retired.[10]
See also: The Overcapacity Trap: Barriers to Entry and Exit in Steel | Zombie Steel Mills: Why State Aid Delays the Inevitable
The 2023–24 export surge — with Chinese steel exports reaching approximately 110–120 Mt — has triggered the most widespread international trade response since 2015–16. Anti-dumping and countervailing duty investigations are under way or being expanded in the EU, USA, India, Brazil, Mexico, and across Southeast Asia. The EU's Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) will add a further cost barrier to Chinese steel exports into Europe from 2026.[3]
The export pressure is structural, not cyclical: as long as domestic demand remains below installed capacity, export pressure will persist regardless of international trade measures, which simply redirect flows to less-protected markets.
See also: Trump Steel Tariffs: Global Impact Analysis | Two Worlds: Carbon Pricing Splits the Steel Industry
China's steel industry accounts for approximately 15% of the country's total CO₂ emissions — and roughly 8–10% of global CO₂ from all sources. China has committed to carbon neutrality by 2060 and peak steel sector emissions before 2030. However, the pathway from the current BF–BOF-dominated production base to low-carbon steelmaking is technically and financially formidable.[7]
The primary transition route — BF–BOF to EAF using scrap and eventually H₂-DRI — will depend on the trajectory of domestic scrap availability, green hydrogen costs, and the carbon pricing regime. China's national Emissions Trading System (ETS) is expected to be extended to steel in the mid-2020s, which would alter investment economics, but coverage and pricing levels remain uncertain.
See also: What If Steel Stays Dirty? Consequences of Decarbonisation Failure | Two Worlds: Carbon Pricing Splits the Steel Industry
China's real estate sector crisis — following the Evergrande collapse and the broader deleveraging of property developers — has structurally reduced the largest single end-use of Chinese steel. Residential construction, which consumed an estimated 30–35% of Chinese steel at peak, has contracted sharply and is unlikely to return to previous levels given demographic trends (declining population) and the existing housing stock overhang.
Infrastructure investment — supported by government stimulus — has partially compensated, but the era of double-digit steel demand growth driven by urbanisation and construction is over. China's steel market is maturing into a replacement-demand economy, fundamentally changing the investment calculus for new capacity.
China's dependence on imported iron ore — predominantly from Australia and Brazil — is a persistent strategic vulnerability. Australia supplies approximately 65% of China's iron ore imports; the 2020–22 Australia-China trade dispute (which included an unofficial ban on Australian coal but notably not ore, given China's inability to rapidly replace supply) highlighted this vulnerability.[8]
China has actively pursued diversification through the Simandou project in Guinea (joint development with Baowu and Rio Tinto), investments in African and Central Asian ore bodies, and support for domestic low-grade ore utilisation. However, Australian ore's cost and quality advantage means diversification will be partial at best over the medium term.
Despite over a decade of government-mandated consolidation targets, China's steel industry remains highly fragmented. The top 10 producers account for approximately 42% of output — well below the government's 60% target. Private groups and local government-controlled producers have resisted absorption into national SOE champions, citing loss of autonomy, different corporate cultures, and local political pressures.[1]
Consolidation is important for decarbonisation as well as industrial policy: larger, better-capitalised groups have greater capacity to invest in green technology, manage the long transition, and absorb the costs of environmental compliance. The fragmented structure of the private and local-government sector impedes the deployment of capital at scale.
📚 Sources & Further Reading
Authoritative sources underpinning the data and analysis on this page.
World Steel Association
- World Steel in Figures — annual production & trade data
- Monthly crude steel statistics
- Sustainability indicators
China Iron & Steel Association (CISA)
- Monthly production and inventory statistics
- Industry policy statements
- Carbon reduction roadmap documents
Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT)
- Steel industry Five-Year Plan targets
- Capacity permit and production data
- Ultra-low emissions implementation reports
OECD Steel Committee
- Excess Capacity Reports — global overcapacity data
- Steelmaking technology and decarbonisation analysis
SteelOnTheNet
- Plant Capacity Database
- Country Maps
- Company histories: Baowu, Ansteel, Hesteel, Shagang, Jianlong, Shougang, Baosteel, Shandong Steel, Wuhan I&S, TISCO, Maanshan, Fangda, Rizhao, Liuzhou, Hunan I&S, Citic Pacific, Benxi, Baotou
- Latest news: Asia-Pacific Steel News
Global Energy Monitor
- Global Steel Plant Tracker — plant-level emissions and status
- Carbon lock-in analysis for Chinese BF–BOF capacity
SteelOnTheNet Insights
- The Overcapacity Trap: Barriers to Entry and Exit in Steel
- Zombie Steel Mills: Why State Aid Delays the Inevitable
- Trump Steel Tariffs: Global Impact Analysis 2025–2026
- What If Steel Stays Dirty? Consequences of Decarbonisation Failure
- Two Worlds: Carbon Pricing Splits the Steel Industry
- Steel Industry Challenges: Top 10 Issues
References
- China Iron and Steel Association (CISA) / Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT): Steel Industry Five-Year Plans (13th, 14th) — consolidation and capacity targets
- World Steel Association (2025): World Steel in Figures 2025 — production, consumption and per capita data
- Global Trade Alert / European Steel Association (EUROFER) (2025): Chinese steel export data and trade remedy filings, 2024–25
- European Commission (2025): Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism — steel sector implementation guidance
- Ansteel Group / Baowu Steel: Respective Annual Reports and investor presentations 2024–25
- MIIT (2024): Electric Furnace Steelmaking Promotion Guidelines and capacity permit updates
- International Energy Agency (2024): Iron and Steel Technology Roadmap — China decarbonisation pathway analysis
- China Customs / National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) (2024): Iron ore and coking coal import statistics and Simandou project updates
- China Scrap Steel Application Association (CSSAA) (2025): Ferrous Scrap Statistics China — domestic generation and policy framework
- OECD Steel Committee (2024): Excess Capacity in the Global Steel Industry — global overcapacity estimates including China
How to Cite This Page
Kotas, A.M. (2026) 'China Steel Industry: Facilities, Resources & Analysis', SteelOnTheNet. Available at: https://www.steelonthenet.com/resources/countries/china.html (Accessed: 7th October 2026).
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